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Abstract
We revisit the interplay between di§erentiation and divisionaliza-
tion in a duopoly version of Ziss (1998). We model divisionalization
as a discrete problem to prove that (i) firms may choose not to be-
come multidivisional; and (ii) there may arise asymmetric outcomes
in mixed strategies, due to the existence of multiple symmetric equi-
libria. If industry-wide divisionalization is the unique equilibrium, it
can be socially e¢cient provided goods are almost perfect substitutes.
Even small degrees of di§erentiation may su¢ce to make industry-
wide divisionalization socially desirable because of the prevalence of
consumers’ taste for variety over the replication of fixed costs.
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1 Introduction
The early literature on multidivisional firms investigates monopoly models
where the subject matter is the use of divisionalization as a strategic en-
try barrier (Schwartz and Thompson, 1986; Veendorp, 1991). A subsequent
stream of literature translates the idea into oligopoly games to show that
divisionalization may be an instrument to acquire a dominant position, or,
replicate Stackelberg leadership1 (Corchón, 1991) but, since all firms share
this incentive, the outcome is definitely procompetitive and may even drive
the industry towards perfect competition if divisionalization is costless (Po-
lasky, 1992).2 Baye et al. (1996a,b) add up a fixed cost per-division to show
that the resulting equilibrium, with the same finite number of divisions per-
firm, can be socially e¢cient if the industry is a duopoly.3 This literature
relies on product homogeneity and linear variable costs.
To the best of our knowledge, the only exception contemplating product
di§erentiation in the representative consumer approach used in the bulk of
the aforementioned literature is Ziss (1998), where each firm’s product is an
imperfect substitute of the rivals’ products, in such a way that intra-firm
(resp., inter-firm) competition takes place in di§erentiated (resp., homoge-
neous) products. Leaving aside the issue of social e¢ciency, Ziss (1998)
treats the number of divisions as a continuous variable and illustrates the
e§ect of product di§erentiation on the number of divisions at equilibrium.
Ziss (1998) assumes products to be di§erentiated across firms but not across
1Of course, this has a lot to do with strategic delegation (Vickers, 1985; Fershtman
and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987). The relationship between divisionalization and delegation
is explicitly considered in Ziss (1999), Bárcena-Ruiz and Espinosa (1999) and González-
Maestre (2000). For a reconstruction of the debate, see Lambertini (2017).
2However, going multidivisional may facilitate implicit collusion (Dargaud and Jacques,
2015).
3Corchón and González-Maestre (2000) extend the analysis to the case of concave de-
mand functions, to prove that either perfect competition or a natural oligopoly may obtain
at equilibrium as the cost of divisionalization shrinks. See also González-Maestre (2001),
where an analogous result emerges from a discrete choice model of spatial di§erentiation.
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divisions and demonstrates the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium with
symmetric multidivisional firms, even in the limit case in which divisional-
ization is costless, for any degree of product di§erentiation. This finding
has a twofold implication: (i) the result outlined in Polasky (1992) emerges
only when the product is homogeneous also across firms and not only across
the divisions belonging to the same firm; and (ii) the perfectly competitive
outcome remains out of reach even when divisionalization costs are nil, pro-
vided products are not perfect substitutes. Moreover, Ziss (1998) also shows
that the peak of the optimal per-firm number of divisions is sensitive to both
industry structure and product di§erentiation.
This approach, as well as the bulk of the aforementioned literature, fo-
cusses itself on the existence and characterization of optimal divisionalization,
under the (somewhat implicit) assumption that firm will divisionalise them-
selves. By doing so, it overlooks the possibility for a firm facing a rival which
goes multidivisional to respond by not divisionalising itself. This is the route
we take here, to produce the following results.
• Accounting for the integer problem, the decision on divisionalization
gives rise to a discrete-strategy game in which firms maintain the op-
tion not to do it, and indeed don’t divisionalise themselves if the cost of
divisionalization is too high and product substitutability is low enough.
It is worth stressing that an analogous result has emerged in the afore-
mentioned debate. In particular, González-Maestre (2000, Props. 1(i)
and 3(i), pp. 327-28) shows that single-division firms will appear at
equilibrium in a homogeneous good duopoly where divisionalization
and strategic delegation à la Vickers (1985) coexist. This is due to the
fact that if the number of firms is small, then every firm obtains a rela-
tively high fraction of industry profits; consequently, the possibility of
becoming multidivisional is not appealing, as the incentive to increase
market share is more than o§set by the damage created by the increase
in the intensity of market competition. Moreover, González-Maestre
(2001, Prop. 1(ii), p. 1303) uses a spatial model à la Salop (1979) to
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find, amongst other things, that if the number of firms is su¢ciently
small as compared to the elasticity of the transportation cost function
borne by consumers, then firms will remain single-division entities. Ad-
ditionally, Corchón, (1991, Example 1, p. 2) using a hyperbolic demand
function for a homogeneous good, proves that the number of divisions
is undetermined in duopoly (which admits the case of single-division
firms).
• There exists an intermediate range of values of fixed costs and product
substitutability in which multiple equilibria arise, including, with a
positive probability, asymmetric equilibria.
• The alignment of private and social preferences towards industry-wide
divisionalization occurs only for su¢ciently low levels of fixed costs and
product di§erentiation.
To keep the model manageable, we confine our attention to the duopoly
case, although we also extend the analysis to the scenario in which, should
firms speculate about becoming multidivisional, they could examine the pos-
sibility of activating a finite generic number of divisions. The interesting
feature emerging from this slight generalisation consists in the fact that the
choice between a single division or more than two does not give rise to a
prisoners’ dilemma.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out
in section 2. The solution of the game is outlined in section 3. Section 4 deals
with the welfare analysis. the extension to a generic number of divisions is
assessed in section 5. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Setup
The model looks the same as in Ziss (1998), except for the number of
firms and the explicit consideration of the integer problem concerning the
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number of divisions. We consider two firms operating in a Cournot mar-
ket for di§erentiated goods produced at a common and constant marginal
cost which can be normalised to zero for the sake of simplicity and with-
out further loss of generality. Each firm o§ers a homogeneous good, which
is an imperfect substitute of the variety supplied by the rival. Firm i has
di ≥ 1 divisions (or franchisees), each one controlled by a manager compet-
ing with all others (including those operating the remaining di − 1 divisions
of firm i). The inverse demand function for division h belonging to firm
i is pih = a − qih −
P
` 6=h qi` − s
Pdj
m=1 qjm, where a > 0 is the common
choke price and s 2 (0, 1] measures the degree of substitutability between
any two varieties o§ered by di§erent firms. The cost of building up each
division is F > 0. Hence, the profit function of firm i if it has di divisions
is πi =
Pdi
`=1 pi`qi` − diF . Since every firm’s divisions sell the same homoge-
neous good, pi` = pi for all ` = 1, 2, ...di, and therefore the profit function of
firm i can be written as πi = pi
Pdi
`=1 qi` − diF .
Unlike the extant literature on multidivisional firms which we have sum-
marised in the introduction, our purpose consists in modelling the firms’
divisionalization choices as a game in discrete strategies, which, by construc-
tion, encompasses the possibility of asymmetric outcomes where firms are
endowed with di§erent numbers of divisions. This choice is motivated by
the intent of showing that the scenario in which firms decide not to become
multidivisional entities may indeed be an equilibrium one, and the simplest
way of achieving this result consists in supposing that initially both firms
have a single division and then ask themselves whether to add a second one
or not. Accordingly, we have to examine three cases: (i) both firms are
multidivisional entities; (ii) only one is multidivisional; (iii) neither one is.
The game has a two-stage structure. Initially, both firms have a single
division each. In the first stage, firms simultaneously and noncooperatively
decide whether to build up a second division or not; in the second stage,
market competition takes place in the output space under complete, sym-
metric and imperfect information, given the number of divisions chosen at
5
the previous stage. The solution concept is subgame perfection by backward
induction, with the choices of firms at the first stage being public domain
before setting output levels.
3 Solving the game
To clarify the reason why we shall focus upon the binary choice between one
and two divisions, we may summarise the general setup in Ziss (1998) by
supposing, initially, that both firms are multidivisional organizations, with
di ≥ 1 divisions each. The profit function of the generic division h = 1, 2, ...di
of firm i = 1, 2 is
πih =
0@a− qih −X
`6=h
qi` − s
djX
m=1
qjm
1A qih − F (1)
and the profit function of firm i is Πi =
Pdi
h=1 πih. Firms’ owners choose
their respective number of divisions to maximise their firms’ profits in the
first stage, and managers choose outputs to maximise the profits of their
individual divisions in the second stage. Agents’ choices are noncooperative
and simultaneous in both stages. The Cournot-Nash output of every single
division is
qCNih =
a [1 + dj (1− s)]
1 + dj + di [1 + dj (1− s2)] (2)
so that the relevant objective function of the owner of firm i at the first stage
is
ΠCNi =
dia
2 [1− dj (1− s)]2
[1 + dj + di (1 + dj (1− s2))]2
− diF (3)
Given the functional form of (3), the resulting first order condition @ΠCNi /@di =
0, in addition to making its analytical solution cumbersome, does not lend
itself to an intuitive interpretation, even under the symmetry condition di =
dj = d :
a2 [1− d2 (1− s2)]
[1 + d (1− s)] [1 + d (1 + s)]3 − F = 0 (4)
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Clearly, the quartic equation in (4) could be solved w.r.t. d, and its solution
studied numerically, as in Ziss (1998). This procedure, however, involves
treating d first as a continuous variable (which allows one to write (4)), and
then accounting for the fact that d is indeed an integer.
Our alternative approach consists in modelling the divisionalization choice
as a discrete problem, in which firms must initially decide whether to build
up a second division or not. Following the backward induction procedure,
we first have to solve the three relevant subgames determined by the firms’
decisions at the first stage. In case (i), both firms are multidivisional orga-
nizations; the profit function of the generic division h = 1, 2 of firm i = 1, 2
is
πih = [a− qih − qi` − s (qj1 + qj2)] qih − F (5)
and straightforward calculations deliver the Cournot-Nash equilibrium levels
of outputs and parent firm’s profits:
qCNMM =
a
3 + 2s
; πCNMM =
2
'
a2 − F (3 + 2s)2(
(3 + 2s)2
(6)
where subscript MM indicates that both firms are multidivisional, and
πCNMM > 08F 2 (0, FMM) , FMM ≡
a2
(3 + 2s)2
(7)
In case (ii), firm i has two divisions while firm j has a single one. Ac-
cordingly, the relevant profit functions at the market stage are
πih = (a− qih − qi` − sqj) qih − F (8)
πj = [a− qj − s (qih + qi`)] qj − F (9)
Solving for the asymmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium, one obtains
qCNi1 = q
CN
i2 = q
CN
MS =
a (2− s)
2 (3− s2) ; q
CN
j = q
CN
SM =
a (3− 2s)
2 (3− s2) (10)
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with qCNSM 2
)
qCNMS, 2q
CN
MS
*
, and
πCNi = π
CN
MS =
a2 (2− s)2 − 4F (3− s2)2
2 (3− s2)2
πCNj = π
CN
SM =
a2 (3− 2s)2 − F (3− s2)2
4 (3− s2)2
(11)
where subscriptsMS and SM identify the multidivisional firm and the single-
division firm, respectively, and
πCNMS > 08F 2 (0, FMS) , FMS ≡
a2 (2− s)2
(3− s2)2 (12)
πCNSM > 08F 2 (0, FSM) , FSM ≡
a2 (3− 2s)2
(3− s2)2 (13)
Then, case (iii) depicts the Cournot duopoly made up by single-division
firms, whose equilibrium is familiar from Singh and Vives (1984):
qCNSS =
a
2 + s
; πCNSS =
)
qCNSS
*2 − F = a2 − F (2 + s)2
(2 + s)2
(14)
with
πCNSS > 08F 2 (0, FSS) , FSS ≡
a2
(2 + s)2
(15)
Tedious but trivial calculations are needed to establish the following:
Lemma 1 FSS ≥ FSM > FMS ≥ FMM for all s 2 (0, 1] .
This Lemma implies that the condition F 2 (0, FMM) is necessary and
su¢cient for equilibrium profits to be strictly positive in any possible sub-
game (or, for any shape taken by the internal organization of firms). In order
to leave aside trivial outcomes, this is the range in which we are going to in-
vestigate the first stage of the game, taking place in discrete strategies and
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described by Matrix 1.
2
S M
1 S πCNSS ; π
CN
SS π
CN
SM ; π
CN
MS
M πCNMS ; π
CN
SM π
CN
MM ; π
CN
MM
Matrix 1
In order to determine the equilibrium outcome(s) of the stage game in
Matrix 1, one has to assess the sign of πCNSS − πCNMS and πCNSM − πCNMM , as
well as πCNSS − πCNMM , which determines the Paretian properties of symmetric
equilibria. This exercise yields
πCNSS ≥ πCNMS 8F ≥ max
+
0, F SSMS
,
, F SSMS ≡
a2 [s2 (4− s2)− 2]
2 (2 + s)2 (3− s2)2 (16)
with F SSMS > 0 for all s 2
-p
2−p2, 1
i
;
πCNSM ≥ πCNMM 8F ≥ max
+
0, F SMMM
,
, F SMMM ≡
a2 [8s2 (3− s2)− 9]
4 (3 + 2s)2 (3− s2)2 (17)
with F SMMM > 0 for all s 2
0q
3
)
2−p2*/2, 12 . Instead, πCNSS > πCNMM always.
This property has relevant consequence, which we shall dwell upon below.
Moreover, on the basis of (7) and (16-17), we may formulate the following:
Lemma 2 FMM > max
+
0, F SMMM
, ≥ max+0, F SSMS, for all s 2 (0, 1] .
For any given value of the choke price a, the critical levels of F appearing
in Lemma 2 look like the curves in Figure 1.
Recalling that we must confine our attention to F 2 (0, FMM) , the map
can be used to characterise the equilibrium outcomes of the first stage of the
game, by referring to the areas I − III identified by the curves:
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• in region I, F 2 )0, F SSMS* ; therefore, πCNSS < πCNMS and πCNSM < πCNMM .
Here, playing strategy M is convenient irrespective of the rival’s be-
haviour, which, in the game-theoretical jargon, entails that the game
is solvable in dominant strategies
• in region II, F 2 )F SSMS, F SMMM* ; therefore, πCNSS > πCNMS and πCNSM <
πCNMM
• in region III, F 2 )F SMMM , FMM* ; therefore, πCNSS > πCNMS and πCNSM >
πCNMM
Figure 1 The partition of the (s, F ) space emerging from Matrix 1
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-
(0, 0)
F
bF
a2/9
sbs 1
FMM
F SSMS
F SMMM
a2/25
III
II
I
Accordingly, we are in a position to claim
Proposition 1 For all F 2 )0, F SSMS* , i.e., in region I, (M,M) is the unique
equilibrium at the intersection of dominant strategies; in region II, i.e., for
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all F 2 )F SSMS, F SMMM* , the first stage portrays a coordination game with two
symmetric equilibria in pure strategies, (M,M) and (S, S); in region III, i.e.,
for all F 2 )F SMMM , FMM*, (S, S) is the unique equilibrium at the intersection
of dominant strategies.
The above Proposition implies the following:
Corollary 1 If (M,M) is the unique equilibrium at the first stage (region
I), then the 2× 2 game describing owners’ decisions about divisionalization
is a prisoners’ dilemma. If instead (S, S) is the unique equilibrium, it is also
Pareto-e¢cient for firms.
The fact that πCNSS > π
CN
MM is implicit in the nature of the delegation
contract instructing each manager to compete against any of the rival’s divi-
sions as well as the other division inside the same firm, all of this in a setting
where di§erentiation inside the same firm is altogether absent by assumption.
Hence, the e§ect of the instructions given to any manager implies a sort of
cannibalization e§ect amplified by perfect substitutability.
The arising of multiple equilibria in region II means, of course, that for all
F 2 )F SSMS, F SMMM* , the mixed-strategy equilibrium becomes relevant too, and
its outcome may be asymmetric (see the Appendix). Intuitively, Proposition
1 says that the number of divisions at the industry equilibrium decreases
in the size of F . This reflects the essence of the problem faced by firms
when deciding whether to go multidivisional or not: each firm has to balance
the business-stealing e§ect exerted upon the rival, on one side, against the
cannibalization e§ect taking place internally, together with the duplication
of the fixed cost, on the other. This is the source of the prisoners’ dilemma
situation emerging in region I, when profit incentives drive industry-wide
divisionalization but cannibalization and competition, combined with the
duplication of fixed costs, make the equilibrium ine¢cient for players. The
same argument explains the multiplicity of equilibria arising in region II, as
soon as the additional fixed cost required for setting up the second division
slightly decreases below F SMMM : at that point, firms know that becoming
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multidivisional is rational only if both do so, because the incremental gross
profits created by a second division may not justify the fixed cost involved in
its creation (recall that the product is homogeneous across a firm’s divisions).
Along the orthogonal dashed lines, one can reconstruct the same con-
siderations under a slightly di§erent light. Moving upwards along the ver-
tical line at bs, one can replicate the results in Proposition 1, while for anybF 2 )0, F SSMS44s=1* it can be seen that the progressive decrease of product dif-
ferentiation (as s ! 1) drives firms towards (M,M), illustrating the seem-
ingly counterintuitive idea that increasing product substitutability favours
divisionalization. To explain this result, take the opposite viewpoint, and
observe that any s 2
-
0,
p
2−p2
i
prevents divisionalization. This is quite
obvious in the limit case s ! 0, where πCNMM = πCNSS because firms are inde-
pendent monopolists in two unrelated markets and therefore divisionalization
is pointless. As s increases, the negative externality exerted by firm j’s vari-
ety along the demand function faced by each division of i increases as well,
creating the necessary pressure to go multidivisional as di§erentiation has
decreased enough, which happens as soon as s >
p
2−p2.
4 Welfare analysis
Since Baye et al. (1996a), we are accustomed with the idea that profit in-
centives will induce a socially e¢cient level of divisionalization in duopoly,
as in this case the increase in industry output - which, by definition, is pro-
competitive - may more than o§set the replication of fixed costs (Baye et al.,
1996a). If the number of firms is higher than two, the second e§ect prevails
and hinders welfare, much the same way as in entry models (see, e.g., Mankiw
and Whinston, 1986). However, in Baye et al. (1996a) the good is homoge-
neous, and we are about to see that imperfect product substitutability makes
a di§erence. The relevant welfare levels can be easily calculated substituting
equilibrium outputs appearing in (6), (10) and (14) in the definition of the
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welfare function SW = U − TC in which
U = a
0@ diX
`=1
qi` +
djX
m=1
qjm
1A− 1
2
24 diX
`=1
q2i` +
djX
m=1
q2jm + 2
 
diX
h=1
qih
X
6`=h
qi`
djX
h=1
qjh
X
m6=h
qjm + s
 
diX
`=1
qi`
!0@ djX
m=1
qjm
1A1A35 (18)
is the utility function of the representative consumer, and TC = (di + dj)F
is the total cost function of the industry. This procedure delivers
SWMM =
4a2 (2 + s)
(3 + 2s)2
− 4F
SWMS = SWSM =
a2 [59− 4s (11 + s (1− s))]
8 (3− s2)2 − 3F
SWSS =
a2 (3 + s)
(2 + s)2
− 2F
(19)
with SWSS > 0 for all F 2
-
0, eFSS< , eFSS ≡ a2 (3 + s) / '2 (2 + s)2( , and
SWSM = SWMS > SWSS8F 2
-
0, eF SSSM< , eF SSSM ≡ a2 [3 (15− 8s)− 4s2 (5− 2s)]
8 (3 + 2s)2 (3− s2)2
SWMM > SWSM = SWMS8F 2
-
0, eF SMMM< , eF SMMM ≡ a2 [4 (5− 3s)− s2 (5− 4s)]
8 (2 + s)2 (3− s2)2
(20)
with the intuitive ranking eFSS > eF SSSM ≥ eF SMMM ≥ 0 for all s 2 (0, 1] , entailing
that having both firms multidivisional is socially e¢cient if and only if the
fixed cost is lower than the lowest threshold, i.e., F 2
-
0, eF SMMM<. Moreover,eF SSSM and eF SMMM are decreasing and convex in s, unlike those describing firms’
incentives in Matrix 1, the reason being that preference for variety boosts
consumer surplus and expands the space for a socially e¢cient divisionaliza-
tion, coeteris paribus. Thus far, the welfare analysis obviously implies that
social preferences are monotone in F, as usual. However, while eFSS > FMM
and eF SMMM ≥ F SMMM for all s 2 (0, 1], F SMMM and F SSSM cross eF SMMM at s ∼= 0.933
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and s ∼= 0.976, respectively. This fact, which is represented in Figure 2 (in
which eFSS does not appear), identifies regions {A, B, C, D, E, F, G} , whose
inspection reveals the following:
Proposition 2 Private and social preferences about divisionalization (or
product proliferation) are reciprocally aligned only in regions A and G. In
G, the unique equilibrium at the upstream stage is (S, S) , which is privately
and socially Pareto-e¢cient. In A, the unique equilibrium is (M,M) , which
is socially e¢cient (although ine¢cient for firms).
In particular, the conflict between private and social preferences is solved
if the fixed cost and product di§erentiation are both very low, in which case
industry-wide divisionalization is socially welcome. Leaving aside region G,
this alignment breaks up as soon as consumers’ taste for variety becomes
relevant enough. To grasp the reason, one may think of s being arbitrarily
close to zero: in such a case, products are (almost) completely unrelated and
firms operate as (almost) independent monopolists on two di§erent markets;
hence, resorting to divisions whose mandate is to act independently is not a
sound idea. In order to acquire a significant role and give rise to an equilib-
rium featuring bilateral divisionalization (or franchising), products must be
(or become) very close, if not necessarily perfect, substitutes.
14
Figure 2 Private vs social preferences concerning divisionalization
6
-
(4/5, 0)
F
s1
F SSSM
eF SMMM
eF SSSM
F SMMM
FMM
AB
C
D
E
F
G
We may now take a quick look at the remaining regions. In B and C, a
public authority would like both firms to build up a second division, but this
may happen only in mixed strategies (in region B), or cannot happen because
(S, S) is the unique equilibrium (in region C). These two regions portray all
situations in which the taste for variety and the resulting consumer surplus
are strong enough to more than o§set the replication of fixed costs and make
the divisionalization of both firms socially desirable, but firms’ incentives
do not yield this outcome (whose attainment would require subsidising firms
through a tax - possibly lump-sum - levied on consumers’ income). In regions
D, E and F it would be socially e¢cient to have a single divisionalised firm
but this may happen probabilistically only in E, while in D and F firms end
15
up ‘undersupplying’ and ‘oversupplying’ divisionalization, respectively.
5 Extension
To complement the foregoing analysis, we also illustrate the scenario in which
firms operate either a single division or d ≥ 2 divisions each, as this perspec-
tive permits one to single out an interesting property of the model.
In the case of industry-wide divisionalization, straightforward calculations
deliver the Cournot-Nash equilibrium levels of outputs and parent firm’s
profits:
qCNMM =
a
1 + d (1 + s)
; πCNMM =
d
'
a2 − F (1 + d (1 + s))2(
(1 + d (1 + s))2
(21)
with
πCNMM > 08F 2 (0, FMM) , FMM ≡
a2
(1 + d (1 + s))2
> 0 (22)
The critical level FMM in (22) implies that, if d were arbitrarily large, the
choice of becoming multidivisional would become unfeasible, and the whole
game we are investigating would be inadmissible, since limd!1 FMM = 0, for
any finite value of the choke price a.
If firm i has d divisions while firm j has a single one, one obtains
qCNi1 = q
CN
i2 = q
CN
MS =
a (2− s)
2 + d (2− s2) ; q
CN
j = q
CN
SM =
a [1 + d (1− s)]
2 + d (2− s2) (23)
with qCNSM 2
)
qCNMS, 2q
CN
MS
*
, and
πCNi = π
CN
MS =
d
h
a2 (2− s)2 − F (2 + (2− s2))2
i
[2 + d (2− s2)]2
πCNj = π
CN
SM =
a2 [1 + d (1− s)]2 − F [2 + (2− s2)]2
[2 + d (2− s2)]2
(24)
Moreover,
πCNMS > 08F 2 (0, FMS) , FMS ≡
a2 (2− s)2
[2 + d (2− s2)]2 (25)
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πCNSM > 08F 2 (0, FSM) , FSM ≡
a2 [1 + d (1− s)]2
[2 + d (2− s2)]2 (26)
Obviously, the residual case in which both firms are single-division entities
coincides with case (iii) in section 3.
The critical thresholds of the fixed cost F can be calculated anew, to find
that the equivalent of Lemma 1 holds qualitatively unmodified, and
F SSMM =
a2
'
1− d (1 + s)2(
(2 + s)2 [1 + d (1 + s)]2
< 08d ≥ 2 and s 2 (0, 1] (27)
in which F SSMM is the critical level of the fixed cost beyond which π
CN
SS > π
CN
MM ,
and therefore define the prisoner’s dilemma condition; moreover,
F SMMM =
a2
h
1 + d− d2 (1− 2s2) + d3 (1− s2)2
i
[1 + d (1 + s)]2 [2 + d (2− s2)]2 (28)
F SSMS =
a2
h
4− d (2− s2)2
i
(2 + s)2 [2 + d (2− s2)]2 (29)
While F SMMM > 0 provided d is finite and substitutability is su¢ciently high,
F SSMS > 0 if and only if d 2 {1, 2, 3} . This is the consequence of the fact that
F SSMS ≤ 0 for all d > 4/ (2− s2)2, which increases in s and is equal to four at
s = 1, i.e., under perfect substitutability.
This finding implies that, for any d ≥ 4, region I in Figure 1 disappears,
and therefore the prisoners’ dilemma with (M,M) as an ine¢cient equilib-
rium of Matrix 1 cannot arise. Hence, there remain regions II and III,
with the same equilibrium properties illustrated in Proposition 1. In turn,
this entails that the alignment between private and social preferences only
obtains in region G in Figure 2, in which (S, S) is the unique equilibrium
both privately and socially e¢cient.4 The conclusion emerging from this ad-
ditional exercise can be summarised in the following remark, which indeed
reflects the social ine¢ciency of replicating sunk costs:
4The details of calculations related to the welfare analysis with d divisions are omitted
for the sake of brevity, as the relevant expressions of the critical thresholds of F pertaining
to the welfare assessment keep the properties and signs illustrated in section 4.
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Remark 1 If firms contemplate the possibility of having d ≥ 4 divisions each,
the 2×2 upstream game is never a prisoners’ dilemma, and this prevents the
alignment of social and private preferences onto multidivisionalization.
6 Concluding remarks
Relying on a duopolistic version of the model used by Ziss (1998), with di-
visionalization choices modelled in discrete strategies, we have shown that
firms may decide not to become multidivisional, or may give rise to asym-
metric outcomes in mixed strategies, due to the arising of multiple equilibria.
As for the scenario in which the unique equilibrium involves industry-wide
divisionalization, this is also socially e¢cient in a limited range of product
di§erentiation (indeed, very close to perfect substitutability). This result
qualifies a well known conclusion dating back to Baye et al. (1996a), ob-
tained under the assumption of product homogeneity. In particular, a small
degree of product di§erentiation may su¢ce to jeopardise the alignment be-
tween private and social preferences.
The parameter region wherein the choice concerning divisionalization is a
prisoners’ dilemma vanishes as soon as firms assess the possibility of setting
up a symmetric number of divisions larger than two. This also implies that
the alignment between private and social incentives may only arise in corre-
spondence of the equilibrium outcome in which firms remain single-division
entities.
Appendix
In order to characterise the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies relevant for
region II, we may assume that firm 1 (resp., 2) attaches probability p 2 [0, 1]
(resp., q 2 [0, 1]) to strategy S. Firm 1 must choose p so as to make firm
2 indi§erent between S and M , and the problem of firm 2 in choosing q is
analogous. The relevant expected profits for the two firms, calculated along
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columns or rows, are the following:
Eπ2 (S) = pπ
CN
SS + (1− p) πCNSM
Eπ2 (M) = pπ
CN
MS + (1− p) πCNMM
(A1)
Eπ1 (S) = qπ
CN
SS + (1− q) πCNSM
Eπ1 (M) = qπ
CN
MS + (1− q) πCNMM
(A2)
Solving the system Eπi (S) = Eπi (M) , i = 1, 2, we obtain
p∗ = q∗ =
πCNMM − πCNSM
πCNMM − πCNSM + πCNSS − πCNMS
(A3)
which is positive and lower than one in region II.
The probabilities of observing each of the four possible outcomes are
P (S, S) = p∗q∗ = (p∗)2 = (q∗)2
P (M,M) = (1− p∗) (1− q∗) = (1− p∗)2 = (1− q∗)2
P (M,S) = P (S,M) = (1− p∗) q∗ = (1− q∗)2 p∗
(A4)
The last step consists in assessing the probability for firms to play one of the
two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, P (N ) = P (S, S)+P (M,M) against
the probability of making a mistake, P (M) = P (M,S) + P (S,M), with
P (N )− P (M) =
)
πCNMM − πCNSM − πCNSS + πCNMS
*2
(πCNMM − πCNSM + πCNSS − πCNMS)2
> 0. (A5)
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